

31
INCOMING TELEGRAM. Department of State
EXCISE

82

SECRET

Action NNNWZCZCLODD203
SQM PP RUEHC RUEPJS
DE RUOTCR 71130/1 0322145
ZNY 53355

Info P R 032121Z MAR 67
SS FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
CEM TO RUEHC?SECSTATE WASHDC
SF RUEPJS/SECDEF WASHDC
SQ INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY
SAH RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
BT
H SECRET LONDON 7113
E/R
P NATUS

CSIA SUBJECT: TRILATERAL TALKS MORNING SESSION - MARCH 3
NSC
INR SUMMARY

CIA
NSA MCCLOY MADE BLUNT STATEMENT OF US VIEW THAT TALKS WERE NOT
DDC ADDRESSING FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF HOW PRESERVE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
ACDA AND MAINTAIN THE DETERRENT. HE EXPRESSED US CONCERN AT INDICATIONS
E SPIRIT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY WHICH HAD ANIMATED WEST FOR
CEA DECADES WAS BECOMING ERODED. HE SAID THAT SECURITY AND
ERB BUDGETARY PROBLEMS ALIKE COULD BE SOLVED ONLY IN FORMER SPIRIT
TRB OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL AGREEMENT WAS NOW AGAIN RESTORED TO
TRB VITALITY. THOMSON REHEARSED UK'S VIEW

RSR

003873
DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/KR
REVIEWED BY Rays DATE 4/1/85
RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. ELATION(S)
ENCL ☐
SECTION 1 OF 2
DECLASSIFICATION ☐
RELEASE DATES
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS 552(h)(1)



1. THOMSON OPENED MEETING BY NOTING THAT FULL STATEMENTS OF
UK AND FRG POSITIONS MADE BY HIMSELF AND DUCKWITZ AT MONDAY'S

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2- LONDON 7113 MARCH 3, 1967 SECTION 1 OF 2
MEETING AND INVITED MCCLOY TO MAKE STATEMENT ON BEHALF USG.
MCCLOY HOPED THAT TRILATERAL TALKS WOULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR
PRESERVING NATO WHICH HAS ALREADY SUFFERED SERIOUS DAMAGE.
HE NOTED CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AS REFLECTED IN THE

PAGE 3 RUOTCR 71130/1 S E C R E T
NATO ALLIANCE IS IN GREAT JEOPARDY AND THAT THIS IS OF MAJOR CONCERN
TO USG. US IS OF COURSE, KEENLY AWARE OF PROBLEMS WHICH FACE
FRG AND UK. MOREOVER, ISSUES SO SERIOUS THAT THEY ARE RECEIVING
ATTENTION AT HIGHEST USG EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE LEVELS
BEFORE PRESENTING US POSITION.

2. IN VIEW USG, MCCLOY CONTINUED, MORE IS AT STAKE THAN

QUESTIONS OF FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE. THERE IS DANGER THAT
CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY, THE KEYSTONE OF NATO MAY BE UNDER-
MINED. TO REINFORCE THIS POINT, MCCLOY CITED: UNFORTUNATE
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A) THREATS OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM
EUROPE ON BASIS OF BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS, B) SOVIET
VISITORS TO NATO COUNTRIES ATTACK OTHER MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE AND
THEIR CHARGES GO UNREBUTTED, C) US IS ACCUSED OF "COMPLICITY"
WITH USSR EVEN THOUGH THRUST OF US POLICY CLEARLY BASED ON
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PARTNERSHIP.

3. THESE EXAMPLES SEEM TO SIGNIFY A REAWAKENING OF NATIONALISM
FOLLOWING EARNEST POST-WAR EFFORT TO OVERCOME THAT SPIRIT.
MCCLOY RECALLED THAT FORMER ENEMY HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO ASSUME
POSITION OF EQUALITY AND DIGNITY IN WESTERN ALLIANCE. IT IS
IMPORTANT TO RECAPTURE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND TO REINVIGORATE

PAGE 4 RUOTCR 71130/1 S E C R E T
THE ALLIANCE. THUS FAR, THE TRILATERAL TALKS HAVE DONE LITTLE
TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL.

4. IN LIGHT OF ABOVE POINTS MCCLOY STATED US POSITION IN THE
TRILATERAL TALKS IS BASED ON FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: A) DECISIONS
FROM TRILATERAL TALKS MUST NOT JEOPARDIZE ALLIANCE OR WESTERN
SECURITY FOR FINANCIAL REASONS, B) JUST AS SECURITY IS A PROBLEM
COMMON TO ALL, SO ALSO ARE MONETARY PROBLEMS. BOTH MUST BE SOLVED
IN COOPERATION. C) HENCE, FORCE LEVELS MUST BE ARRIVED AT ONLY
BY AGREEMENT D) FRG SHOULD DECIDE ON HOW MUCH PROCUREMENT FROM US
AND UK IT CAN AFFORD, AND E) AT SAME TIME FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-3- LONDON 7113 MARCH 3, 1967 SECTION 1 OF 2

ARISING FROM STATIONING US AND UK FORCES IN FRG MUST BE HANDLED BY MANAGING MONETARY RESERVES OR BY OTHER AGREED MEANS, F) IN ANY CASE, ALL DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE THREE POWERS MUST BE CONFIRMED WITHIN NATO.

5. TURNING TO DETENTE, MCCLOY STATED THAT USG FAVORS EXAMINING CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS WHICH CAN FOSTER GENUINE DETENTE. MUST KEEP IN MIND SOVIET CAPABILITIES ARE INCREASING ESPECIALLY IN AREA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WEST SHOULD APPROACH RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS FREE FROM ILLUSIONS. MCCLOY NOTED IRONY THAT US IS NOT TOO

PAGE 5 RUDTCR 7113C/1 S E C R E T
RECENT PAST RECEIVED CRITICISM FROM ALLIES FOR ADHERING TOO LONG TO "HARD LINE" BUT NOW BEING CRITICIZED FOR ATTEMPTING TO FIND SOLUTION WITH SOVIETS AT ARMS RACE. BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN TWO NUCLEAR SUPER-POWERS ON THIS QUESTION ARE INESCAPABLE; BUT US HAS APPROACHED THEM WITHOUT ILLUSION AND NOT WITH PURPOSE OF UNDERMINING THE ALLIANCE.

6. MCCLOY CONCLUDED BY STRESSING THAT CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS ARE OVERDUE IN TRILATERALS AND THAT SEVERE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT BE SOLVED BY ULTIMATA. USG ALSO FACES POLITICAL AND BOP PROBLEMS, WHICH WILL REQUIRE COOPERATION TO SOLVE JUST AS WILL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS FACING FRG AND UK. FOR ITS PART USG WILL NOT DEFAULT ON ITS COMMITMENTS TO NATO FOR THE COMMON SECURITY. THERE WILL BE NO US SHORTFALLS. FURTHER, US IS NOT STALLING. PROBLEM OF PRESERVING DETERRENT AND OUR VITAL RELATIONSHIP TO WESTERN EUROPE IS COMPLEX AND NEEDS CAREFUL STUDY. ALTHOUGH TIME FOR DECISION IS FAST APPROACHING, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF BASIC PURPOSES OF TRILATERAL TALKS.

7. IN RESPONSE THOMSON WELCOMED MCCLOY'S FRANKNESS



DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM. Department of State

Def 1

SECRET

82

Action

SCM

ZCZCLDD209

003906

1967 MAR 3 PM 6 04

Info

PP RUEHC RUEPJS

DE RUDTOR 7113072 3522205

ZNY SSSSS

SS

P R 032121Z MAR 67

GPM

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

SP

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

SC

RUEPJS7SECDEF WASHDC

SAH

INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN

L

STATE GRNC

H

BT

EUR

SECRET LONDON 7113 SECTION 2 OF 2

P

NATUS

USIA

NSC

SUBJECT: TRILATERAL TALKS - MORNING SESSION - MARCH

INR

CIA

NSA

DCD

ACDA

E

CEA

FRB

TRS

RSR

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

100-7113
69-67

SECRET

-2- LONDON 7113, MARCH 3, 1967 SECTION TWO OF TWO

A-3

PAGE 3 AUDTOR 7113C/2 S E C R E T

11. COMMENTING ON STATEMENTS BY DUCKWITZ MCCLOY NOTED IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING POSSIBILITY OF RECIPROCAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE AND EMPHASIZED THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE RAPIDLY. USG, HOWEVER, WOULD WELCOME DISCUSSION IN THIS AREA PROPOSED BY FRG AND HOPES IDEAS WILL BE FORTHCOMING. THOMSON

A-3

12. MCCLOY SAID TALKS SHOULD NOT BE IMPEDED BY STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS BASED ON PURELY FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN HIS VIEW, UK "TRIP WIRE" STRATEGY IS POISONOUS SINCE IT RESULTS IN ONLY TWO OPTIONS: DESTRUCTION OR SURRENDER. IN REBUTTAL, THOMSON

13. IN REPLY TO DUCKWITZ SUGGESTION THAT WGII EXAMINE US AND UK "REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES" MCCLOY COMMENTED THAT ANY DETAILED STUDY WOULD BE PREMATURE SINCE US HAD MADE NO DECISIONS ON REDUCTION OF FORCES. THOMSON THEN BROKE IN TO ASSERT UK HAD ALSO TAKEN NO SUCH DECISION. MCCLOY FELT GENERAL STUDY COULD BE MADE LIMITED E.G. TO TYPES OF AIRLIFT AVAILABLE NOW AND IN FUTURE. HE NOTED USG VIEW THAT DEVICES COULD BE WORKED OUT FOR REIN-

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

FORCEMENT WHICH COULD AFFORD ADEQUATE ASSURANCE TO EUROPEAN NATIONS. BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO BEAR IN MIND EASE WITH WHICH WARSAW PACT CAN REINFORCE AS COMPARED TO EITHER UK OR US.

UTILITY: IT COULD MAKE NO RECOMMENDATIONS ON "AMOUNTS" UNTIL GERMAN CABINET HAD REACHED DECISIONS; FURTHER, THIS ACTIVITY WOULD GET INTO RANGE OF QUESTIONS WHICH GERMAN BUNDESBANK BEELS STRONGLY SHOULD BE DECIDED OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENTS. DUCKWITZ

SECRET

A 4x12 grid of dots representing a 4x12 pixel image. The dots are arranged to form a stylized face with a wide smile, closed eyes, and a small nose. The grid is composed of black dots on a white background.

SECRET

-4- LONDON 7113, MARCH 3, 1967

SECTION TWO OF TWO

15. THE PRINCIPALS ACCERTED MCCLOY'S SUGGESTION OF MEETING MARCH 22 RATHER THAN 16-17 IN ORDER ALLOW FRG MORE TIME FOLLOWING CABINET DECISIONS EXPECTED MARCH 15.

27. THOMSON ALSO TABLED DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR WORKING GROUP ON RECIPROCAL REDUCTION. NEITHER US NOR FRG DELEGATION COMMENTED ON THIS DRAFT AT MORNING SESSION. (SEE SEPTTEL FOR FINALLY AGREED TERMS OF REFERENCE.)

13. WGLI'S REPORT ON IMBALANCES IN FORCES OF NATO CENTRAL REGION, REQUESTED ON MONDAY, WAS TABLED, NOTED AND REFERRED TO NATO DPC FOR CONSIDERATION FORCE PLANNING EXERCISE.

KAISER
BT

SECRET

SECRET